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MAN-RATING THE GEMINI-TITAN II AIR FORCE LAUNCH VEHICLE
By Haggai Cohen 
Martin Company 
Baltimore f Maryland
Summary
The paper examines the disciplines and new approaches being utilized 
which together comprise the "Man-Rated" Gemini-Titan II Air Force Launch 
Vehicle Program, It discusses the critical component program; the technical 
and specialized skill training and certification program; the Quality Systems 
Engineering approach; the advanced corrective action and failed parts analysis 
program; the classification of characteristics program established for fabrica­ 
tion and test; the workmanship discipline approach; individual performance 
measurement; the Zero Defects program; personnel motivation; Air Force Space 
Systems Division disciplines imposed by the "Pilot Safety Program"; the 
limited life component program; the procurement controls imposed; and finally, 
an evaluation of the effectiveness of this "Man-Rated" approach.
Man-Rating in Design
Man-rating is defined as the marshalling of the disciplines necessary to 
achieve a satisfactory probability of crew (astronaut) survival. Technically, 
this probability may be expressed in terms of reliability of the launch vehicle 
and reliability of the Malfunction Detection and Escape System. Mathematically, 
these terms are linked in the equation -
PCS = RLV + (1-RLV } D E 
where:
P~~ = Probability of crew survival Oo
R v = Reliability of launch vehicle
and ^ = Reliability of the Malfunction Detection and Escape System.
It can be seen that to maximize probability of crew survival, careful 
attention must be given to such launch vehicle items as:
(1) Use of redundancy to improve launch vehicle reliability.
(2) Design of a reliable Malfunction Detection System based on analysis 
of launch vehicle failure modes.
(3) Utilization of the crew as part of the Malfunction Detection System. 
(k) Designing a vehicle checkout program which minimizes the probability
of launching a defective vehicle. 
(5) Utilization of a disciplined Quality & Reliability Assurance Program
to prevent degradation of inherent design reliability.
Malfunction Detection System
The MDS monitors launch vehicle parameters that affect crew safety. It 
actuates lights and meters in the spacecraft which, in display form, warn the 
astronauts of potential dangers or malfunctions. The Gemini MDS was designed 
to make maximum use of the astronaut's decision-making capabilities which re­ 
sulted in a system of increased reliability and simplicity. It is a manual
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abort system whereby the astronauts, from the displayed performance parameters f 
determine if abort action is required. The choice of performance parameters 
was based on careful analysis of modes of failure, probability of these failures 
to occur, times to catastrophe, and crew reaction time at various phases of the 
boost flight. The parameters selected for display are:
Engine thrust chamber pressures for both vehicle stages,
Tank pressures on all tanks in vehicle,
Overrates in pitch, yaw and roll,
Staging sequence,
Switchover from primary to secondary flight control system.
The MDS was designed with full sensor redundancy, redundant power supply 
circuits, separated installations of primary and secondary system elements, 
and fail safe design and hook-up to minimize possibility of signalling a false 
malfunction.
Flight Control System
During the course of conducting the failure mode analyses, one particular­ 
ly critical type of failure evolved - that of an engine "hard-over" during 
Stage I flight approaching "Max Q". At this point, structural break-up would 
occur in approximately one second. This is obviously too rapid for the manual 
abort philosophy which requires time for detection, reaction, escape initiation 
and actual escape. It was determined that a way out of the dilemma was to 
radically reduce the likelihood of a "hard-over" engine condition by adding a 
redundant flight control system to the launch vehicle*
The redundant system utilizes a primary string of a three-axis reference 
system (with integral programmer), a radio guidance system, an autopilot, rate 
gyros, and a hydraulic system feeding a newly designed tandem or dual actuator* 
The secondary system utilizes the inertial guidance system of the spacecraft*, 
a secondary autopilot, secondary rate gyros and an independent secondary hydraul­ 
ic system feeding the alternate side of the tandem actuator.
Switchover is automatically accomplished if any of the following malfunc­ 
tions occur during Stage I flight.
(1) Loss of hydraulic pressure in the primary hydraulic system.
(2) Engine thrust chamber movement to "hard-over" position.
(3) Excessive turning rates in any of the three (3) axes.
(k) Manual command of crew.
Since dynamic pressures are much reduced during Stage II flight, the "hard- 
over" condition is no longer critical then. As a result, no redundant hydraulic 
or tandem actuators are used in Stage II. However, switchover of the remainder 
of the system is automatically accomplished if turning rates are excessive in 
pitch, yaw or roll or by manual selection of the crew.
Electrical System
The electrical system was designed with redundancies in all major circuits* 
There are two separate power buses fed by individual batteries. These alternate 
supplies are fed to such components as:
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(1) Program initiate relays
(2) kO second time delay relays (lockout spacecraft shutdown)
(3) Staging control relays
O) Staging switches
(5) Explosive separation nuts
(6) Stage I & II engine shutdown circuits
(7) Guidance shutdown relay for Stage II
(8) Manual booster shutdown switches
(9) Range safety equipment
Critical Component Program
An important element in the Gemini Quality program was the establishment 
of a critical component program to prevent degradation of inherent reliability 
by means of "tender loving care. ff A review of the airborne components was 
made, and utilizing the selection criteria shown below, 5^ items were designa­ 
ted as critical*
(1) failure modes associated with the component design and application 
will result in vehicle mission failure and crew abort*
(2) failure modes associated with the component design and application 
will significantly decrease the probability of mission success*
(3) failure of the component during countdown will result in a hold or 
kill and prevent meeting launch window required for rendezvous 
mission*
The component is a design unique to Gemini and has no previous manned 
vehicle application*.
The selection criteria were also supplied to the manufacturers of the 5^ 
critical components with the requirement to review and select the piece parts 
of the component which should be classified as critical. These piece parts 
lists were then reviewed, negotiated and finally approved by the Martin Relia­ 
bility Group and the Air Force* The following controls were then instituted 
on the resulting hundreds of piece parts.
(1) Identify critical parts with tags, decals, etc*
(2) Segregate critical parts so that they cam be more carefully handled*
(3) Institute special MRB (Material Review Board) procedures to carefully 
control repair or rework of critical parts*
(*f) Prohibit acceptance of parts which have exhibited transient mal­ 
functions unless a conclusive reason and conclusive repair can be 
found*
(5) Control changes to design and manufacturing processes to maintain 
qualification configuration*
(6) Provide planned storage and handling to minimize damage*
(7) Provide prompt, detailed failure analysis and corrective action on 
failed critical parts, but obtain Martin permission for corrective 
action affecting design or processes since this constitutes a con­ 
figuration change*
(8) Indoctrinate personnel handling critical parts in the above require­ 
ments*
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(9) Source inspect critical components, utilizing residen
t Martin
Quality personnel to audit for adherence to critical part 
require­ 
ments*
(10) Provide certificate of compliance with above require
ments with each 
shipment of critical components.
The above controls have also been instituted on components
 fabricated 
within Martin and the entire program has resulted in an aw
areness of the 
special requirements of the Gemini Program. The number of
 trouble reports 
written on critical components at the launch site, for exa
mple, reflects very 
little difficulty with critical parts*
Training & Certification 
Selection of Personnel
A prime objective in the selection of Gemini personnel was
 utilization 
of Titan experience. This was especially true in design, 
vehicle testing, 
fabrication and launch crew operations. The initial selec
tion, therefore f 
factored in a group of highly trained and experienced pers
onnel. This group 
was supplemented by additional qualified people and then a
ll the personnel 
were processed through a carefully planned series of orien
tation, safety 
and technical training courses suited to the particular in
dividual and his 
planned assignment. The courses culminated in an evaluati
on of the absorp­ 
tion of training by means of test scores and of performanc
e on-the-job. The 
end result is to have every Gemini team member technically
 competent "to perform 
his job, have him understand the importance of his contrib
ution to the Gemini 
program, and the importance of the objectives of the Progr
am to the country*
Certification cards are awarded to each trained man on the
 Gemini team* 
Quality personnel make certain that only "card carrying me
mbers 11 are performing 
Gemini tasks*
A special on-the-job training program exists at the launch
 site because 
of the requirements to work together as a launch team* Sp
ecial training 
exercises have been run in loading propellants, simulating
 hazardous operations 
or safety problems. Crew certification has resulted, in ad
dition to individual 
certification, and this program has paid handsome dividends
 in the form of 
smooth, disciplined and coordinated countdown exercises.
Certification boards, consisting of managers of operating 
divisions, ad­ 
minister the certification program and maintain the high s
tandards demanded by 
the program*
Motivation
Much emphasis has been placed towards developing the attit
ude of each 
member of the Gemini team towards his job. The requiremen
ts of the highest 
standards of workmanship, the need for striving towards pe
rfection, the develop­ 
ment of pride in workmanship have been stressed utilizing 
astronaut visits; 
special Gemini stickers on equipments, decals for automobi
les of team members, 
special Gemini pins; imaginative posters, coveralls or sho
p coats with Gemini 
insignia, and a constant program of articles using the Mar
tin newspaper are a 
few of the motivation techniques being utilized.
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An additional, intensive motivational campaign has been instituted in 
the form of "Zero Defects". This program instituted a series of defect goals, 
which become more stringent with time, and against which measured defects are 
plotted. The program embraces all phases of activity including non-hardware 
support areas. Award programs have begun, both on an individual and department 
al basis. The main point of the entire campaign is the cons taint reminder that 
there are no "insignificant mistakes" on the Gemini Man-Rated Program.
The trouble reporting system has been modified to print out on an auto­ 
mated tab run the badge numbers of individuals contributing to operator errors 
resulting in hardware discrepancies* This tab run aids in determining addit­ 
ional training requirements or, in extreme cases, de-certification of Gemini 
team members.
Limited Life Program
An operating life test program begun on the Titan program was continued 
on the Gemini program. In general, life test data was used in conjunction with 
qualification test data, together with mode of failure analysis and failure 
histories to arrive at a maximum operating life limit for selected time sensi­ 
tive components. These limits are then used as a basis for rejection if actual 
operating hours exceed the limit established. An automated equipment time re­ 
cording system is in operation which starts to operate during acceptance test­ 
ing at the supplier's facility, continues through receiving inspection and 
bench testing at Martin, through sub-system, system and combined systems test­ 
ing in the factory and at the launch site. System operating times are obtained 
from specially designed multi-channel recorders. The tab run prints out by 
part number, and by serial number, the actual and accumulated operating hours 
with identification to various test phases in which the time was accumulated.
A refurbishment plan is under negotiation which allows for increases in 
operating life based upon careful replacement of selected time or wear sensi­ 
tive piece parts, followed by a retesting program*
The limits that were selected are conservative and in consonance with the 
Gemini reliability goals.
Quality Systems Engineering
A Quality Systems Engineering Group was established on Gemini by assign­ 
ing competent professional engineers to the various sub-systems of the vehicle 
at the beginning of the design effort. These engineers participate^ in draw­ 
ing reviews, specification preparations, vendor selections, qualification and 
acceptance test procedure reviews, design reviews, etc* In particular, they 
Were assigned the following major tasks:
(1) Maintain a continuous study of assigned system to permit technically 
competent decisions in following tasks*
(2) Review specifications (contract, test, procurement), for addition of 
Quality Assurance provisions.
(3) Review test, maintenance and operating procedures for adherence to 
specifications for adequacy and for selection of key check points.
(4) Review and approve Qualification, Acceptance and Production Monitor­ 
ing test procedures and reports from suppliers and for in-house 
testing.
(5) Examine and approve specification deviations and waivers, Material 
Review Board reports and minor variation review reports* This was 
done to increase the technical level in decision-making associated
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with non-conformances.
(6) Review engineering changes with an emphasis on establishing retro­ 
fit inspection and test plans to restore hardware to its pre-change 
integrity.
(7) Participate in test team operation to review adequacy of selection 
of ke^y check points (item 3 above) and to perform on-the-spot 
failure analysis on test anomalies*
(8) Analyze and accept for Quality, test results, telemetry data, land 
line recordings, etc*
This group is currently performing the bulk of the Corrective Action 
problem investigations and supplying technical liaison with the team of resi­ 
dent field inspectors*
Quality Classification of Characteristics Program
Because of the utilization of existing Titan engineering as a base for the 
Gemini design and since Titan did not have a classification of characteristics 
program, the Quality Engineering Group on Gemini carried out an informal class­ 
ification on fabrication process plans and test procedures. Utilizing criteria 
established for this specific purpose, critical characteristics were highlighted 
for special attention and data documentation by line inspection personnel. 
These special requirements were integrated into the manufacturing planning so 
that they were highlighted also for the fabricators and testers as well.
Procurement Controls
In the early stages of the design effort, a special set of procurement 
specifications were prepared which covered reliability requirements such as 
trouble reporting, equipment operating time recording, failure analyses, failed 
parts analyses, design reviews; critical component requirements; data and docu­ 
mentation requirements such as format and content needs of qualification and 
acceptance test procedures and reports. These specifications were referenced 
as applicable in the individual procurement drawings and the extent of these 
references reviewed by Reliability and Quality Engineering.
In placement of business with new suppliers, bid evaluation was performed 
by Design Engineering, Reliability, Quality Engineering and Procurement.
Acceptance and Qualification procedures prepared by the suppliers were 
reviewed and approved by Martin before testing could proceed. Test Reports 
were then reviewed and accepted similarly.
Detailed contractor acceptance plans were prepared by Quality Engineering 
for use by resident Quality personnel. These are inspection instructions em­ 
bracing process reviews, quality system audits, hardware audits, specification 
compliance requirements and test procedure data.
Vendor workshops were planned and carried out during which the special 
requirements of the Gemini Program were explained and discussed. Interface 
problems were aired and corrective action instituted as required. These 
sessions served greatly in bringing these suppliers into the Gemini team with 
increased enthusiasm, cooperation and understanding.
A continuous system of audits in suppliers houses is serving as an impetus 
to keep the rigid controls in active force.
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Vehicle Chaperones
To assure continuous compliance with contract, specifications and draw­ 
ings, a Quality Assurance expert is assigned to each launch vehicle as chaper- 
one* He begins with the tank fabrication at Martin-Denver, conducts the tank 
roll-out inspection there, travels with the tanks to Martin-Baltimore, remains 
with the launch vehicle through final assembly and vertical tests, is respon­ 
sible for acceptance of vehicle documentation during the Acceptance Team 
exercise at completion of vertical tests, accompanies the vehicle to Cape 
Kennedy, observes stowage of the vehicle during flight, verifies loading and 
unloading operations, participates in the receiving inspection at the Gape and 
observes the flight test preparations. He maintains a historical record of 
significant problems, their applicability to his vehicle and their resolution* 
Since he is the one individual who devotes full time to a particular vehicle, 
he is best equipped to have readily available the major problems that have 
occurred during fabrication, inspection, shipment and testing*
Pilot Safety Program
The major function of the Air Force Space Systems Division/Aerospace Pilot 
Safety Program is to ensure that the concern for crew safety is contained in 
launch vehicle planning, is reflected in appropriate activities, and that the 
Tehicle history is well documented and thoroughly assessed prior to launch. It 
is implemented by a continuous technical monitoring of all phases of the pro­ 
gram from design through launch. It is also implemented by concentrated reviews 
at key focal points in the build-test-accept sequence. The areas that are 
rigorously reviewed are:
(1) Engineering design
(2) Development testing
(3) Engineering changes
(4) Production plans and processes
(5) Inspection
(6) Testing
(7) Handling
(8) Acceptance activities
(9) Launch operations
(10) Configuration documentation
(11) Test data and procedural reviews
(12) Corrective action status and problem resolutions*
Stringent requirements are imposed during the acceptance phase and hard­ 
ware is not accepted until Air Force Space Systems Division and Aerospace are 
convinced that the hardware and documentation comply with specifications and 
contractual requirements* This acceptance is characterized by a methodical f 
uncompromising attitude*
Holl-Out Inspection
This is the first major inspection conducted upon completion of tank 
fabrication at Martin-Denver. The Air Force review covers tank weld informa­ 
tion, significant problem history, laboratory tests on materials, stress 
analyses on weld repairs or discrepancies, and a Hwalk-aroundff inspection to 
make certain there-are no doubts as to the man-rated quality of the vehicle 
tanks*
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Vehicle Acceptance
Upon completion of all sub-system and system testing in Martin-Baltimore, 
a Vertical Acceptance Team conducts a comprehensive review of hardware logs, 
test results, observes combined systems test and audits the assembled hardware* 
The team assures that the following criteria has been met:
(1) Completion of satisfactory component, sub-system, system and all 
systems acceptance test.
(2) Completion of documentation of hardware status including history and 
identification of components by serial number, test data, configura­ 
tion status and problem areas encountered, together with their 
resolution*
(3) Special detailed report containing critical component history. 
(*O Completion review (no vehicle or spares shortages).
Flight Safety Review
A similar review is conducted by the Flight Safety Review Board just prior 
to flight and constitutes the final activity of the Pilot Safety Program by 
making the final decision of committing the booster to launch*
This review covers the following areas:
(1) Significant details of previous Gemini and Titan launches.
(2) Modifications to hardware, mission and procedures since previous 
review.
(3) History of launch vehicle through production, acceptance and AMR
activities. 
(*f) Report and recommendations of the Launch Vehicle Status Review Board.
(5) Complete technical review of the significant problem areas.
(6) Report on personnel changes of the launch crew and status of flight 
readiness teams.
Following the above review, the FSRB decides whether or not to commit 
the vehicle to launch and presents this decision to the senior NASA representa­ 
tive for his concurrence or rejection.
Corrective Action and Failure Analysis Program
In adding man-rating to the trouble reporting - corrective action loop, 
the most important changes are:
(1) Generation and utilization of trouble report data from all possible 
applicable sources.
(2) A problem investigation of all actual and potential problems, with
emphasis on striking the words "random failure 11 from the vocabulary*
(3) A planned corrective action loop embracing Martin-Denver, AMR and all 
Gemini suppliers which directs necessary corrective action in careful 
detail with authority to carry it through.
Detailed problem documentation and disposition decisions for each 
trouble report. Note that each report and problem is reviewed and 
the disposition concurred with by SSD/Aerospace.
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(5) Failed parts analyses carried to sufficient depth by experts in this 
technique, utilizing new non-destructive testing techniques to firm­ 
ly establish mechanism and failure cause. This includes dissection 
of piece parts such as diodes, capacitors f potted modules, etc*
Because of similarity of design, Titan sources of data are utilized to 
a great degree*
Open problems are added as constraints to significant PERT events and 
hence get top management attention and pressure for resolution*
Speed of response of suppliers in carrying out failed parts analyses is 
a major problem in maintaining rapidity of response to open problems* It 
should be noted that all open problems must be reviewed and a determination 
made whether or not to proceed with the next key PERT event* It is especially 
important that the number of open problems be small prior to a Flight Safety 
Review Board or a Vehicle Acceptance Team Meeting*
Evaluation of Benefits Gained from Man-Rated Program
Many benefits of the above program are starting to appear quite clearly. 
Some of these are:
(1) The Gemini-Titan II Launch Vehicle will have all components fully 
qualified prior to flight*
(2) The number of hardware failures on airborne components at AMR is 
significantly low*
(3) The difficulties encountered in testing procedures, ground equipment 
interfaces, facility interfaces, were significantly low for the first 
launch vehicle*
(4) Test schedules were set and could be adhered to because of comparative 
freedom from major problems*
(5) EEI (Electrical/Electronic Interference) problems have been at a minimum,
(6) Air Force confidence has been high because of depth of response and 
scope of problem coverage*
(7) Marked inroads in area of vendor control have been pioneered on this 
program with resulting higher reliability hardware*
(8) An unprecedented position of value and contribution to success of the 
program has been achieved by the Quality and Reliability Groups*
(9) Full spares support of qualified hardware was available at AMR to • 
support the first launch vehicle on schedule*
(10) A complement of highly trained and motivated personnel are available 
to continue the efforts accomplished to date*
(11) Interfaces with associate contractors on the Program have been firmly 
established and cooperation is excellent, particularly in the tech­ 
nical and trouble reporting - corrective action areas*
In conclusion, although at the time of this writing the proof of perform­ 
ance is yet to come, it is felt that the enormous increase of attention to de­ 
tails, the "tender loving care 11 , the many disciplines added, the competence of 
personnel, etc*, will all contribute to a program which may well serve as a 
model for future manned space efforts*
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